The Epistemology of Alvin Plantinga by Teodorescu, Valentin
Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists 
Series on Philosophy, Psychology, Theology and Journalism 
Online ISSN 2067 – 113X Volume 6, Number 1–2/2014 115 
 
 
 
 
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF ALVIN PLANTINGA 
 
Valentin TEODORESCU∗ 
 
 
Abstract. In this article we intend to present Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology by 
showing the way in which its central concepts: the Reidian foundationalism, the 
partial critique of evidentialism, warrant, proper function, reliability and externalism - 
are logically interrelated. A section of this article is reserved to the critiques of his 
account of warrant brought by Peter Klein and Richard Feldman and to the way in 
which Plantinga answered them, by developing the concepts of cognitive maxi- and 
mini-environment. In the end we will see the way in which Plantinga’s epistemology 
relates to both modernism and postmodernism. 
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Introduction 
 
A central concept of epistemology is that of ‘knowledge’. In his dialogue 
Theaetetus, Plato raised the question: ‘What is it that which must be added to 
mere true belief to obtain knowledge?’ In this way he suggested that a belief is 
known by us only when it is both true and justified (or warranted).  
Alvin Plantinga, the philosopher whose epistemology we intend to present in 
this essay, prefers to use – when writing about knowledge and its essential 
components – the term ‘warrant’; he makes a certain distinction between ‘warrant’ 
and ‘justification’1 – and defines warrant as ‘(that) elusive quality or quantity 
enough of which, together with truth and belief, is sufficient for knowledge’2. 
Plantinga was well known in the contemporary philosophical world for his 
contributions to the metaphysics of modality and to the philosophy of religion 
(especially on such topics as theodicy and the arguments for the existence of 
God). But starting with the 90’-s, Plantinga began to wrote intensively on 
epistemological subjects. As result, his trilogy on warrant: Warrant: The Current 
Debate (1993), Warrant and Proper Function (1993) and Warranted Christian 
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 As we will see, Plantinga associates the term ‘justification’ with internalism – and considers that 
only the internalists identify warrant with justification. However, his option is for externalism – 
and for externalists there is a clear distinction between these two concepts. 
2
 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, p. v. 
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Belief (2000) won him (also) the fame of being one of the most prominent 
contemporary epistemologists.  
Without entering in detail, we want to make a short note on what might be 
the central theme of Plantinga’s epistemology: its externalism. In contrast with the 
internalists, who affirm that the knower can know that a certain belief has warrant 
(or justification) for her, and that she has epistemic access to whatever it is that 
makes for warrant, Plantinga is an externalist - who generally affirms that what 
makes true belief knowledge is the fact that it is produced by a reliable process.  
In his own externalist model, Plantinga affirms that a belief has warrant only if 
it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly in a cognitive environment 
congenial to them, and according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth. In what 
will follow we will try to see how he arrived to this definition of warrant. 
 
1. The relation between Plantinga’s view 
and  other contemporary’s views on warrant 
 
1.1. Foundationalism and coherentism; the main argument of 
foundationalism 
There are two main views regarding the way in which a belief might get 
warrant in the contemporary epistemology: foundationalism and coherentism. The 
difference between these two positions lays in their attitude toward circular 
reasoning: the coherentist accepts this kind of reasoning, provided that the circle 
is large enough, the foundationalist rejects it.  
For Plantinga, the main reason for foundationalist’s rejection of circularity is 
the importance she gives to the idea of propositional evidence: of accepting one 
proposition on the evidential basis of another. This does not mean that by 
definition evidence for a foundationalist must be always propositional; there 
might be also – in J. Austin words – ‘physical’ evidence (for ex: the ‘proofs’ of a 
crime in a process: a pistol, a torn garment, traces of blood on clothes, etc)3 
However, propositional evidence is crucial when trying to understand the 
differences between foundationalism and coherentism. According to the 
foundationalist, there is a foundational level of beliefs which are not accepted on 
the evidential basis of other beliefs. For example this category includes self-
evident beliefs and beliefs about how one is appeared to. The other beliefs – those 
not included in the foundational level – will be accepted on the evidential basis of 
the foundational (or basic) beliefs.  
Thus, the basic beliefs are the propositional evidence for the nonbasic 
beliefs. In a proper noetic structure, says the foundationalist, a nonbasic belief is 
accepted on the basis of other belief, which may be accepted on the basis of still 
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 Ibidem, p. 177. 
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others, and so on; the chain might be in principle as long as one likes. However, 
due to the fact that we hold only finitely many beliefs, the chain must terminate 
somewhere, in some beliefs that are foundational (not accepted on the basis of 
other beliefs). 
If there is a circle in the basis relation – belief A0 is accepted on the basis of 
A1, which is accepted on the basis of A2,..., which is accepted on the basis of An, 
which is accepted on the basis of A0 – then, says the foundationalist, the noetic 
structure is improper: that is because warrant cannot be generated only by warrant 
transfer. As Plantinga says: ‘A belief B can get warrant from another belief A by 
way of being believed on the basis of it, but only if A already has warrant. No 
warrant originates in this process whereby warrant gets transferred from one belief 
to another.’4 
In conclusion, circular reasoning – argues the foundationalist - is improper. 
Therefore, in her view, foundationalism should be adopted, and coherentism 
rejected. 
 
1.2. Plantinga’s critique of coherentism 
Which is in this case the argument of the coherentist? If, as the 
aforementioned arguments of the foundationalist suggest, he approves circular 
reasoning, then he is clearly mistaken: one cannot get warrant for a belief just by 
showing that it is a member of a circular chain of beliefs - no matter how big this 
circle is. 
However, the coherentist might have another option – suggests Plantinga. He 
might argue that warrant does not arise by warrant transfer, but by coherence 
itself: coherence is the only source of warrant.5 In this way (at least from the 
perspective of the pure coherentist6) a belief is not accepted on the evidential basis 
of any other belief, but on the basic way, ‘the warrant accruing to it (if any) 
arising by way of coherence’.7 
Although so construed the coherentism seems to Plantinga more plausible, 
he stills considers it mistaken, and argues that coherence is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for warrant.8 Coherentism’s main problem is that in its case warrant 
involves only a relation between beliefs (coherence being a doxastic relation); yet 
the relation between experience and belief and environment and belief is also 
essential to warrant.9 
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 Ibidem, p. 178. 
5
 Ibidem, p. 179. 
6
 There might be also the mixed perspective of the impure coherentism, which would allow that 
there can be warrant transfer, but the warrant transferred arises originally by way of coherence. 
7
 Ibidem, p. 179. 
8
 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, ch.4. 
9
 A. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. vii, 179. 
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For example, says Plantinga, there is the case of the Lost Mariner, recounted 
by Oliver Sacks: ‘he suffered from Korsakov’s syndrome, a profound and 
permanent devastation of memory caused by alcoholic destruction of the 
mammillary bodies of the brain. He completely forgot a thirty-year stretch of his 
life, believing that he was 19 years old when in fact he was 49; he believed it was 
1945 when in fact it was 1975. His beliefs (we may stipulate) were coherent; but 
many of them, due to this devastating pathology, had little or no warrant.’10 
(At this point we are aware that many coherentists will not agree with this 
critique of their position. For example, there are some accounts of coherentism 
that also stress the role of evidence: see in this respect the view of such commited 
coherentists as Keith Lehrer11, early Lawrence Bonjour and Thomas Bartelborth; 
these philosophers do not see coherence as a doxastic relation. However, 
Plantinga choosed to understand coherence in this way12; probably, from this 
perspective, he sees these non-doxastic versions of coherentism as rather 
camouflaged versions of fallible foundationalism13). 
But even if to Plantinga coherentism is mistaken, and coherence is not the 
only source of warrant, he does not conclude that coherence is not a source of 
warrant: on the contrary, to him ‘the ordinary foundationalist can hold in perfect 
consistency that many beliefs get at least some warrant by way of coherence, and 
even that some beliefs get all their warrant solely by coherence’14. 
                                                 
10
 A. Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, p. 81. 
11
 Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge, Routledge, London, 1990, p. 114; see also  Mircea Flonta, 
Cognitio: o introducere critica in problema cunoasterii, Editura All, Bucuresti, 1994, p. 157-172. 
12
 In a personal correspondence by email Alvin Plantinga confirmed to me that he holds this 
position. 
13
 Plantinga would probably hold that, since Lehrer and Bonjour accept the role of evidence in 
their accounts – but reject the infallibility of the propositions about our subjective states, their 
position in this respect is not essentially different from that of a fallible foundationalism – and we 
can say that in this respect the truth of the matter is rather a mixture between the coherentist and 
the foundationalist positions (see concerning this position A. Quinton, “The Foundations of the 
Knowledge”, in B. Williams, A. Montefiore (eds.), British Analytical Philosophy, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London, 1966, p. 86, cf. M. Flonta, op. cit., p. 153). However, due to his adherence to 
a Reidian type of epistemology (which will be presented in this paper), Plantinga clearly prefers a 
rather fallible form of foundationalism than a moderate coherentism. 
14
 A. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 180. In my opinion the acceptance of defeaters 
and overriders in Plantinga’s account of warrant (Warrant and Proper Function p. 40-42) suggests 
that sometimes, in some respect, the appeal to coherence in his model is unavoidable. However, 
for a defence of a rather fallible foundationalism than coherentism he could appeal to Chisholm 
suggestions that the relationship between the beliefs about what it appears to us as true and other 
beliefs is not positive, but rather negative (R. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, (second edition), 
Prentice Hall Inc, Englewood Cliffs, 1977, ch..1, p. 75,76). More explicitly, Chisholm denies that 
before we decided that a belief about perceptions is reasonable, we should know that other 
judgments are evident; he agrees in this respect with Thomas Reid, who states that a basic belief 
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1.3. Classical Foundationalism and its rejection by Plantinga 
As we already have seen, Plantinga believes that coherentism is wrong: this 
is a reason for him being a foundationalist. 
However, he also rejects what he calls ‘classical foundationalism’, the kind 
of foundationalist position supported by such modern philosophers as Descartes 
and Locke – a perspective that was very influential from the Enlightenment to the 
present times (and functioning for many philosophers as an almost unquestioned 
assumption).  
Before presenting this view, it is important to understand at this point the 
distinction which Plantinga does between the merely descriptive notion of basic 
belief and the mixed notion (descriptive but also normative) of properly basic 
belief.  
A belief is basic if we accept it, but not on the evidential basis of other 
beliefs: (an exemple of this is 2+1=3). The notion of proper basicality adds to the 
idea of basic acceptance the concept of normativity: ‘…a belief is properly basic 
for me if it is basic for me and I am justified, violating no epistemical duties, in 
accepting it in the basic way’15.    
In the view of classical foundationalism, a belief is properly basic for 
somebody only if it is self-evident for her (for ex. ‘4- 2 =2’) or immediately about 
her experience (incorrigible) (for ex. ‘I am being appeared to redly’)16. In his 
‘Warranted Christian Belief’ Plantinga will add also to these two types of basic 
propositions – pace John Locke – another type: the propositions evident to the 
senses for a person (for ex. ‘My current ideas of treehood are caused by 
something external to me)’)17.  
We can see from his choice of the properly basic beliefs that for the classical 
foundationalist the only propositions that are admitted as properly basic are those 
that are certain for her.18 
The classical foundationalists propose various kinds of evidential 
relationships if their belief in a proposition A is to be properly supported by other 
proposition B. Thus, Descartes seems to suggest that a proposition could be 
accepted in the superstructure of our noetic structure only if it is deduced or 
entailed from the propositions in the foundations. Plantinga observes that 
according to this standard very few of our beliefs would be acceptable to us.19 
However, Locke admitted also in this respect a probabilistic support from the 
                                                                                                                                     
should be accepted as true similar with the case of an accused before his judge (who has the right 
to the presumption of innocence until her guilt is reasonably proved). 
15
 A. Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, p. 19.  
16
 A. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 182.  
17
 A. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 77. 
18
 Ibidem, p. 84. 
19
 Ibidem. 
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propositions of our foundations, and later on Charles Pierce admitted also a kind 
of supporting relationship similar to that between a scientific theory and its 
evidence – which he called ‘abduction’.   
Plantinga summarizes in this way the classical foundationalist position (he 
called it CP): 
(CP) ‘A belief is acceptable for a person if and only if it is either properly 
basic (i.e., self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses for that person), or 
believed on the evidential basis of propositions that are acceptable and that 
support it deductively, inductively, or abductively.’20     
He also criticizes this view for more reasons: 
First of all, he observes that the idea of restriction of proper basicality only 
to the classes of self-evident, incorrigible and evident to the senses beliefs ‘was 
subjected to devastating criticism by Thomas Reid, who pointed out that if it were 
true, very few of our beliefs would have warrant, and that (this) restriction (…) is 
at best arbitrary’.21    
Secondly, he believes that classical foundationalism is self-referentially 
incoherent. It does not fulfill the conditions of justification that it lays down: 
according to classical foundationalism a belief  is justified for us only if it is either 
properly basic (self-evident, incorrigible or evident to the senses) or accepted on 
the evidential basis of beliefs which are properly basic.  But this belief is itself not 
properly basic and ‘it is at least extremely hard to see that it is evidentially 
supported by beliefs that do meet that condition’22.                                                                                                                            
                                                 
20
 Ibidem, p. 84-85. 
21
 A. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 182. 
22
 Ibidem, p. 182. However, there was at least one critique on Plantinga’s attack on classical 
foundationalism. Someone might deny that CP has no justification and that it is self-referentially 
incoherent. One might argue that in fact the principle might be supported by beliefs that meet the 
condition. She could use in this sense the ‘particularist’ method of finding a criterion for true 
propositions, proposed by Roderick Chisholm. According to this method one might start from the 
question ‘which extent has our knowledge?’ in order to arrive to the question ‘Which are the 
criterions of knowledge?’. Chisholm starts from considering the extent of commonsense truths and 
tries to deduce from this extent a criterion for knowledge (Roderick Chisholm, Erkenntnistheorie, 
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München, 1979, p. 170-173; Noah Lemos, Common Sense: A 
Contemporary Defense, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, ch. 6). Philip Quinn uses 
this chisholmian particularist method in order to offer an inductive argument for CP. He tries to 
obtain a criterion of justified belief by gathering samples of justified and unjustified belief and 
suggesting a principle that fits them best. He assembles representative samples of beliefs (J) that 
he thinks are justified and representative samples of beliefs (U) that he thinks are unjustified. 
Afterwards, he observes that all of the beliefs from J but none of the beliefs from U conform to 
CP. For this reason, he concludes (inductively) that a belief is justified if and only if it conforms to 
CP (Philip Quinn, ‘The Foundations of Theism Again’ in Linda Zagzebski (ed), Rational Faith: 
Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 
1993, p. 22ff). Plantinga replies to this argument by denying that (at least some of) the premises of 
Quinn’s argument are properly basic - as the classical picture suggests they should be. The sample 
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Moreover, Plantiga adds that the vast majority of contemporary philosophers 
renounced to it: ‘It has remained for the twentieth century, however, to see it into 
the well-deserved retirement, and the moment the air is full of the announcements 
of the death of classical foundationalism’.23 
However, he does not agree with tendency of the (postmodernist) 
announcers of this ‘death’ to conclude that it entails the rejection of epistemology 
itself, or of the very notion of truth. To think so means for him ‘to confuse species 
with example: it would be like announcing the demise of the nation-state upon 
noting a civil war in Yugoslavia.’24 The only conclusion that follows about truth 
at best is only that we do not have Cartesian certainty about it. To him, ironically, 
those who draw these radical conclusions from the problems raised by classical 
foundationalism think in fact similar with its supporters; they ‘betray concurrence 
with it: the only security or warrant for our beliefs, they and the classical 
foundationalist both think, must arise by way of evidential relationship to beliefs 
that are certain – that is, self-evident or about immediate experience’.25 
 
1.4.  Reidian Foundationalism 
As we already saw, Plantinga rejected classical foundationalism. Still, he defends 
a particular species of foundationalism which he names ‘Reidian Foundationalism’. 
A starting point for seeing the differences between the two sorts of 
foundationalism is to ask: which kinds of beliefs are properly basic? The classical 
foundationalist has taken as properly basic three types of beliefs: those self-
evident, those incorrigible (immediately about the experience) and those evident 
to the senses. Plantinga agrees that these kinds of beliefs are properly basic. 
However, he adds that many other beliefs can also be taken as properly basic.  
                                                                                                                                     
classes include propositions as S1 is justified in believing B1 and S2 is not justified in believing B2. 
He observes that these beliefs are neither incorrigible nor evident to the senses. In this case, in 
order to conform to CP they must be self-evident (A. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, p. 
96). However, says Plantinga, at first sight there seem to be no case of self-evident belief that is 
unjustified – such that the believer has gone contrary to his duty in holding it; that is because 
generally our beliefs are not in our direct control (ex: even if one is offered a million dollars, she 
cannot stop believing that she is over 30 years old). Still, he admits that there might be some cases 
of self-evidently unjustified beliefs (ex: out of vanity and pride one might form the belief that her 
work is unduly neglected when the fact is it gets more attention than it deserves). Still, the real 
problem of the CP supporter is that these cases ‘lend no support to the claim that it is unjustified to 
form a belief that is neither properly basic (according to classical standards) nor believed on the 
basis of such propositions’ (A. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, p. 97). Their support is too 
vague to holding an inductive argument of any sort. Moreover, he argues that there are cases 
where it is self-evident that some beliefs not formed in accord with CP are justified. For example, 
the beliefs produced by our memory are (in general) justified, but they do not satisfy the 
requirements of CP. 
23
 A. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 182.  
24
 Ibidem, p. 183. 
25
 Ibidem,. 
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Thomas Reid pointed out that the majority of our beliefs do not conform to 
CP condition. For example, our beliefs about the past, or about other persons, or 
about external objects (perceptive) are not, according to classical foundationalist, 
properly basic. They must be believed, from the classical foundationalist’s point 
of view, on the evidential basis of the self-evident, incorrigible (immediately 
about her experience) and evident to the senses beliefs.26  
But Reid doubts that this is possible: he argues - and Plantinga agrees with 
him - that they are also properly basic. 
And here is the great difference between the two positions: for example, 
although both accept that ‘how I am appeared’ is crucial to the question whether a 
perceptual judgment has warrant for us, they differ in the way in which they relate 
the experience in question to the perceptual judgment triggered by it.27 
For the classical foundationalist a belief (for example a perceptual one) has 
warrant for us only if we believe it on the basis of experiential propositions that 
support it (by the mediation of deduction, induction or abduction). This view 
suggests at least three requirements: 
1. That a person should believe the experiential propositions (ex: It seems to 
me that I see a dog.). 
2. That she believes the proposition in question on the evidential basis of 
those experiential propositions (‘I see a dog’ is believed on the evidential basis of 
‘It seems to me that I see a dog’.). 
3. That the experiential propositions do offer in fact evidential support for the 
proposition in question.28 
The Reidian view – says Plantinga – by contrasts, disputes each of these 
three demands. For the Reidian foundationalist, when we are appropriately 
appeared to, and other conditions for warrant are met,29 then we have 
knowledge. Having these Reidian definition in mind, we could see – pace 
Plantinga – the Reidian motives for rejecting all three aforementioned classical 
foundationalist’s requirements: 
1. For the supporter of this view, it is neither necessary that we should 
believe the experiential propositions (of the type ‘It seems to me that’, or ‘I am 
appeared to in this way’) nor to believe that the conditions for warrant are met, in 
order to have knowledge. Of course, if we pay attention to our phenomenal field, 
it is probably impossible to fail to believe the aforementioned kind of experiential 
                                                 
26
 A. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, p. 98. 
27A. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 183. See also Nicholas Wolterstorff, Thomas 
Reid and the Story of Epistemology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 23-95. 
28
 A. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 184. 
29
 As we shall see, Plantinga defines in this way the conditions for warrant: that the cognitive 
capacities of the believer should function properly, in an appropriate environment, and according 
to a design plan successfully aimed at truth. 
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propositions. But it is not necessary to pay attention to this field (in fact, in normal 
situations we don’t use to do that) – in order to have warrant for our beliefs. 
Important is nor our believing that we are appeared in this way, but simply our 
being appeared in this way. 
2. If it is not necessary to believe the experiential propositions, then it is not 
necessary to believe the propositions in question (in our example the perceptual 
propositions) on the evidential basis of the experiential propositions. 
3. Moreover, it is not necessary that the experiential propositions should 
offer evidential support (deductive, inductive or abductive) for the propositions in 
question. What matters – and confers warrant to our proposition – is not the 
deductive, inductive or abductive support of the experiential propositions, but the 
fact that they formed in the aforementioned proper circumstances for knowledge: 
being appeared in that way, and satisfying the other conditions for warrant.30 
We will offer in what will follow two examples that show why Reid (and 
Plantinga) believes that the beliefs of common sense are true and properly basic. 
Thus, arguing about the existence of other persons, Reid affirms that: ‘No 
man thinks of asking himself what reason he has to believe that his neighbor is a 
living creature. He would be not a little surprised if another person should ask him 
so absurd a question: and perhaps could not give any reason which would not 
equally prove a watch or a puppet to be a living creature. But, though you should 
satisfy him of the weakness of the reasons he gives for his belief, you cannot 
make him in the least doubtful. This belief stands upon another foundation than 
that of reasoning and therefore, whether a man can give good reasons for it or not, 
it is not in his power to shake it off.’31  
And arguing about perceptual knowledge, Plantinga says: ‘Now I don’t 
know how to prove to someone intent on denying perceptual knowledge that we 
really do have it. I don’t know of any arguments that start from premises the 
perceptual skeptic already accepts sufficiently firmly (and accepts more firmly 
than he accepts perceptual skepticism) and proceed by argument forms he also 
already accepts, to the conclusion that we do have such knowledge. Prior to 
philosophical reflection, however, most of us assume that many of our perceptual 
judgments do constitute knowledge and thus meet whatever conditions are 
necessary for knowledge; this assumption is one of those natural starting points 
for thought of which Richard Rorty says there aren’t any; and the rational stance 
is it to accept it unless there are sufficiently powerful argument against it. As far 
as I can see, however, the arguments against it are nowhere nearly sufficiently 
powerful (…) let me only say that they invariably employ premises whose claims 
on us (as G. E. Moore pointed out) are vastly more tenuous than the claims of the 
                                                 
30
 Ibidem, p.184. 
31
 Thomas Reid, ‘Essays on the Intelectuall Powers of Man’, in R. Beanblossom and Keith Lehrer 
(eds.), Thomas Reid’s Inquiry and Essays, VI, 5, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1983,  p. 278-279, cf. A. 
Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 66. 
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denials of their conclusions. Accepting perceptual skepticism on the basis of these 
arguments is a little like rejecting modus ponens on the grounds that it figures in 
the derivation of the contradiction in the Russell paradoxes (…)’32 
We could ad also that the Reidian foundationalism is a fallibilist type of 
foundationalism. If the classical foundationalist admitted as properly basic only 
those propositions that were certain for her, the Reidian foundationalist accepted 
in the foundation of her noetic structure, in addition to certain propositions of this 
type, also propositions that are not certain (being therefore fallible).33 
 
1.5. Evidentialism 
As we have seen, according to Plantinga, the classical foundationalist insisted 
that our beliefs are formed on the basis of evidence34. For example, a perceptual 
proposition like ‘I see a dog’ is based on such evidence as the experiential proposition 
‘It seems to me that I see a dog’. The reidian also accepted this idea, but added that 
the evidence needs not be only propositional evidence.  
Thomas Reid added, for example – to this type of propositional evidence for the 
truth of a perceptual proposition – also the evidence of the senses (Plantinga will call 
it simply perceptual evidence). In this sense, Plantinga offers the image of a 
peculiarly rigid sort of person who sometimes ignores the evidence of his senses. He 
believes that cacti are to be found only in the southwest of United States. Somebody 
shows him a fine prickly pear in Michigan, but he stubbornly refuses to believe that 
this is a cactus, claiming that the plant is only a thistle. In this case, suggests 
Plantinga, the evidence is not propositional, but nevertheless, it has some features in 
common with propositional evidence - because the rigid gentlemen from our story 
accepted the belief in question in response to this evidence. 
Therefore, Plantinga accepted as initially plausible the premise that 
whenever a belief has warrant for us, we should have evidence for it35. And he 
agrees that for a wide variety of propositions ‘a properly functioning person will 
come to believe them only if she has some evidence – either propositional 
evidence, or perceptual evidence, or the testimonial evidence, or evidence of some 
other sort’.36 For example, he accepted the models of three important 
contemporary defenders of evidentialism – William Alston, Richard Feldman and 
Earl Conee (he called their type of evidentialism, after their initials: AFC) – as 
working well in the cases of propositional, testimonial37 and perceptual evidence. 
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 A. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 89-90. 
33
 A Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, p. 84; Mircea Flonta, Cognitio: o introducere critică în 
problema cunoaşterii, p. 147-149. 
34
 Ibidem, p. 82. 
35
 A. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 185-186. 
36
 Ibidem,  p. 187. 
37
 Some readers will be tempted to believe that testimonial evidence is also a kind of propositional 
evidence. But Plantinga suggests that this is not the case. He offers in this respect an example: 
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However, he suggested that in a vast range of other ordinary cases their 
model is less plausible. He referred specifically to the case of memory, a priory 
knowledge, and consciousness. 
In the case of memory, even if there is here a kind of phenomenal imagery, 
this is too partial, fragmentary and indistinct – to constitute a basis on which to 
form a belief. The imagery is here like ‘a decoration, an irrelevant accompaniment 
of some kind; it isn’t at all like propositional or perceptual evidence’.38 
The situation is similar in the case of a priori knowledge. We might have 
here also ‘a sort of scrappy and indistinct, partial and vague image (auditory or 
visual)’ of a sentence expressing a proposition, but this image is not evidence.39 
In the case of consciousness, he observed that our perceptual beliefs respond 
differentially to the changes in our experience, but that the associated beliefs 
about ourselves when holding these perceptual beliefs do not. For example, 
appeared to one way, I form the perceptual belief ‘I see a squirrel leaping’; 
appeared to another way, I form the belief ‘I see tiger lilies bending in the breeze’. 
But, says Plantinga, ‘there is a constant element in all of them: the part according 
to which it is I who perceive these things’.40 Moreover, it is not by virtue of 
similarity among our experiences that we judge that it is I who does these things: 
‘It is not as if, had my experience been appropriately different, I would have 
judged that it is someone else who sees the squirrel.’41 
Thus, the ‘I think’ element from those beliefs in which occurs (of the form ‘I 
see…’, ‘I judge…’, ‘I believe…’) does not respond diferentially to different 
experiential inputs. As result, that part of these judgments is not formed on the 
basis of evidence – and in this respect it resembles memory and a priori beliefs. 
In conclusion, it seems that AFC model does not work well for memory, a 
priory knowledge and the ‘I think’ element associated to our conscious beliefs. In all 
these cases, we have indeed sensuous imagery, but this imagery is not evidence. 
However, Plantinga agrees that this is not (necessary) all story: he says it 
might be possible that he did not look for evidence – even in these cases – in the 
right place. He observed that sensuous imagery is not the only phenomenal 
                                                                                                                                     
‘You are a sixth grade; your teacher tells you that the population of China exceeds that of India; you 
believe him. Now, conceivably you could believe him on the basis of propositional evidence, reasoning 
as follows: “Teacher says the population of China exceeds that of India; in most of the cases where I 
have checked to see whether what he says is true, it was; so probably it is true in this instance; so 
probably the population of China exceeds that of India”. You could come to that belief in this way; but 
typically you would not (it would be a peculiar sixth grader who regularly formed beliefs in this 
fashion). In the typical case you would simply find yourself believing your teacher, just as, from days of 
earliest youth, you have always been inclined to believe your elders (Ibidem, p. 187). 
38
 Ibidem, p. 188. 
39
 Ibidem, p. 188-189. 
40
 Ibidem, p. 189-190. 
41
 Ibidem, p. 190. 
  
126 Valentin Teodorescu  
accompaniment of memory, a priori and the ‘I think’ type of beliefs. There is 
something else in the phenomenology associated to these types of beliefs: the sort 
of felt inclination or impulsion toward these beliefs. 
For example, the memory belief has also, beyond its related sensuous 
phenomenology, a certain felt attractiveness:  the proposition ‘I remember that 
Paul was there in California’ has a sense of rightness or appropriateness about it – 
as opposed to the proposition that it was Tom there.42 
In the similar way, the a priori beliefs have a sort of attractiveness or perceived 
fittingness about them, familiar to us all. And this fittingness, or felt inclination is 
present not just for memory or a priori beliefs, but also for perception or testimony, 
and so on. Returning to the AFC model, Plantinga observed that this model represents 
a better kind of evidentialism than the classical foundationalist model (who suggested 
that the only possible foundational evidences are the propositional ones: the self-
evident, the incorrigible, and the evident to the senses beliefs) because it is more 
inclusive. Many other beliefs (for example the perceptual beliefs or the beliefs of 
memory) are also basic (for the AFC model).  
However, if we want to be rigorous, the AFC model seems to be incorrect when 
it deals with memory and a priory beliefs – because these beliefs do not seem to 
qualify as evidences. So, it seems that in what concerns them, evidentialism fails – 
according to Plantinga – because it is not able to incorporate them. 
But if we also understand as evidence the aforementioned ‘inclination to 
believe’ or ‘perceived attractiveness’ element, then the AFC model seems to be 
correct: it seems able to incorporate all known forms beliefs. As result, if we 
construe evidences in this broad fashion, then apparently evidentialism is a true 
epistemological concept: all beliefs – in order to have warrant – need to be based 
on evidences.43 
However, even if, understood in this way, evidentialism is a necessary 
condition for warrant, it still does not follow that is also a sufficient condition. The 
main reason is the problem of malfunction: a person seems to remember very well 
an event; still, her belief might nonetheless – by virtue of memory malfunction – 
have no warrant for her. 
What is required for warrant is the absence of cognitive pathology – in other 
words, it is also necessary the proper function of her cognitive system. Evidence 
is necessary for warrant, but not sufficient: proper function is also required. 44 
This is the reason why in the next chapter we will refer in detail to 
Plantinga’s notions of proper function and warrant. 
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 Ibidem, p. 192. 
44
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2. Plantinga’s notion of warrant 
 
Plantinga presented his view on warrant mainly in his ‘Warrant and Proper 
Function, the second book from his trilogy on warrant. For this reason, in what 
will follow, we will refer especially to this book. In the first book from the trilogy 
– ‘Warrant: The Current debate’ – he presented a broad spectrum of contemporary 
accounts of warrant – for example, warrant as ‘having adequate evidences’ 
(already discussed in the previous chapter), warrant as ‘epistemic duty’45 (which 
figures in classical internalism), warrant as ‘having a set the beliefs that is 
coherent’46, warrant as ‘having a reliable set of faculties – reliabilism’47, etc. In 
each of these cases Plantinga argues that, although warrant is clearly connected 
with the respective epistemic value, the beliefs of the person who holds them fail 
in the end to have warrant, ‘because of cognitive malfunction’48. 
 
2.1 Proper Function 
As we saw when presenting Plantinga’s view on evidentialism, one 
important critique of this account of warrant was related to its failure to deal with 
the cases of cognitive pathology. This problem, as we pointed above, affects – 
from his perspective – all other accounts of warrant.  
For example, referring to Chisholm’s dutiful agent, Plantinga says he meets 
Chisholm’s conditions for warrant; his beliefs lack warrant, however, because 
‘they result from cognitive dysfunction due to a damaging brain lesion, or the 
machinations of an Alpha Centaurian scientist, or perhaps the mischievous 
schemes of a Cartesian evil demon’49. The same kind of example could be 
suggested for the other accounts of warrant.  
Therefore, Plantinga suggested that a necessary condition of a belief’s 
having warrant is that our cognitive equipment be free of such malfunction, 
functioning properly. A belief has warrant for us, only if our cognitive apparatus 
‘is functioning properly, working the way it ought to work, in producing and 
sustaining it’.50 More specifically, the parts of noetic equipment involved in the 
formation and sustenance of a belief should function properly51 if that belief is to 
have warrant to us. 
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 A. Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, ch. 2. 
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 Ibidem, ch. 4, 5, 6. 
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 Ibidem, ch. 9. 
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 A. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 4. 
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 Ibidem, p. 4. 
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 Ibidem. 
51
 Plantinga makes also a distinction between a properly functioning cognitive equipment and a 
normally functioning one (if we take this second term in a broadly statistical sense). A person’s 
system might function far from the statistical norm, but it could still be functioning properly: After 
a nuclear disaster nearly all people could be left blind; nevertheless, the few sighted remained 
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However, proper function is not the whole story about warrant; another 
requirement for a belief is that it should be formed in an appropriate cognitive 
environment. 
 
2.2. Appropriate cognitive environment 
As we know, an automobile , even if it is in a perfect working order, does 
not run well on the top of a mountain or under water. In the same way, says 
Plantinga, a belief, even if produced by a properly working cognitive apparatus, 
has no warrant if it is formed in an inappropriate cognitive environment. He offers 
in this respect an example: ‘You have just had your annual cognitive checkup at 
MIT; you pass with flying colors and are in splendid epistemic condition. 
Suddenly and without your knowledge, you are transported to an environment 
wholly different from earth; you awake on a planet revolving around Alpha 
Centauri. There conditions are quite different; elephants, we may suppose, are 
invisible to human beings, but emit a sort of radiation unknown on earth, a sort of 
radiation that causes human beings to form the belief that a trumpet is sounding 
nearby. An Alpha Centaurian elephant wanders by; you are subjected to the 
radiation, and form the belief that a trumpet is sounding nearby. There is nothing 
wrong with your cognitive faculties; they are working quite properly; still, this 
belief has little by way of warrant for you.’52 
As result, another component should be added to warrant: our faculties should 
function properly in an environment appropriate to our epistemic apparatus. 
 
2.3. Degrees of warrant 
To these components involved in his concept of warrant, Plantinga adds 
another one: that of degrees of warrant.  
He observes that our cognitive faculties might work properly in an 
appropriate environment but some beliefs produced by them might have more 
warrant than others. He calls ‘productively equivalent’ those pair of beliefs that 
are produced by faculties functioning properly to the same degree and in 
environments equally appropriate ; his opinion is that a pair of beliefs could be 
productively equivalent  while one of them has more warrant than other. 
Thus, the belief ‘7 + 5 = 12’ has more warrant for him than the rather dim 
and indistinct memory belief that ‘forty years ago I owned a secondhand sixteen-
gauge shotgun’, but both beliefs are produced by properly functioning cognitive 
faculties functioning in an appropriate environment. Moreover, the first belief is 
also more firmly believed than the other.53 
                                                                                                                                     
would still have properly functioning eyes – although, statistically speaking, the blinded ones 
would have ‘normal’ sight (A. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 9-10). 
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 Ibidem, p. 6. 
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 Ibidem, p. 8. 
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He concludes that, if both belief B and B* have warrant for a person S, then 
B has more warrant than B* for S if and only if S believes B more firmly than B*. 
Thus, knowledge demands both true belief and a certain degree of warrant54. 
 
2.4. The Design Plan 
However, Plantinga observed that there might be some beliefs, produced by 
perfectly functioning faculties, in an appropriate environment, which could still 
lack warrant. For example, a person might believe that she will recover from a 
dread disease much more strongly than is justified by statistics of which she is 
aware. Sigmund Freud suggested that religion is an illusion which arises from the 
‘oldest and strongest and most insistent wishes of mankind’55. This idea, says 
Plantinga, suggests that according to Freud religious belief does not arise from 
cognitive malfunction of some cognitive module, but instead ‘by way of wish 
fulfillment’. Still, illusion and wish fulfillments have their functions in the life of 
human being. According to Freud, they enable humans ‘to mask the grim, 
threatening, frightening visage of the world’. As result, even if religious belief is 
not necessary the result of malfunction – being produced by cognitive faculties 
functioning as they should – it still does not enjoy warrant (at least it does not 
enjoy warrant if one accepts Freud’s view on it). 
The problem in those two examples is that the elements in our cognitive 
faculties responsible for the producing of those beliefs – either optimism enabling one 
to survive a deadly illness, or wishful thinking – have not as their purpose the 
producing of true beliefs. On the contrary, they are aimed at something else: survival 
and capacity to carry on in our nasty world. In conclusion, another condition for 
warrant is that the design plan of our cognitive faculties involved in producing our 
beliefs should have as its goal true beliefs. Plantinga says in this respect: ‘What 
confers warrant is one’s cognitive faculties working properly, or working 
according to the design plan, insofar as that segment of the design plan is aimed 
at producing true beliefs.’56 
 
2.5. Reliability 
Even if Plantinga added to the zeroeth approximation of his account of 
warrant (according to which ‘a belief has warrant for us only if it is produced by 
our cognitive faculties functioning properly in an appropriate environment’) also 
the condition that ‘the design plan governing the production of the respective 
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 Ibidem, p. 9. 
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 Ibidem, p. 13. 
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 Ibidem, p. 16. By the term ‚design‘ Plantinga does necessary affirm that human beings have 
been literally designed – by God, for example. He uses this term in the sense in which Daniel 
Dennett uses it when saying that a given organism possesses a certain design – produced to him by 
evolution (A. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 13, Daniel Dennett, Brainstorms, 
Bradford Books, Cambridge, 1978, p. 12). 
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belief must be aimed at producing true beliefs’ – he still belief that the model is 
insufficient. He gives in this sense an example (suggested by Richard Swinburne, 
Ian Foster and Thomas Senor): ‘…suppose a well meaning but incompetent angel 
– one of Hume’s infant deities, say – sets out to design a variety of rational 
persons, persons capable of thought, belief and knowledge. As it turns out, the 
design is a real failure; the resulting beings hold belief, all right, but most of them 
are absurdly false’.57 
In this example, says Plantinga, all three suggested conditions for warrant 
seems to be met: the beliefs of these persons are functioning properly, in a 
cognitive environment for which they were designed, and the design plan 
governing her cognitive modules is aimed at truth. However, the beliefs of these 
beings do not have warrant. 
Therefore, another condition needs to be added: that the design plan should 
be a good one (more precisely, the probability of a belief’s being true – once it 
meets all three aforementioned conditions – should be high). This, says Plantinga58, 
‘it is the reliabilist constraint on warrant, and the important truth contained in 
reliabilist accounts of warrant.59 
 
2.6. Plantinga’s notion of warrant 
In conclusion we may sum up Plantinga’s view on warrant in this way: a 
belief has warrant for us if and only if it is produced by properly functioning 
faculties, functioning in a congenial environment, and according to a design plan 
aimed at producing true beliefs that is good. 
In his words: ‘to a first approximation, we may say that a belief B has 
warrant for S if and only if the relevant segments (the segments involved in the 
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 Ibidem, p. 17; David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part V, Bobbs-Merrill, 
1947, p. 169. 
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 Ibidem, p. 17. 
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 Plantinga agrees that we ordinarily take for granted that when our cognitive faculties (specifically 
those aimed at producing true beliefs), function properly in an appropriate environment, the beliefs they 
produce are for the most part true. If they are not for the most part true, then we have not proper 
function. Still, he holds this fourth condition (of reliability) because he wants to say that it is not 
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this respect a quotation from Patricia Churchland (where she clearly suggested that it is no evident 
correlation between a belief being produced by cognitive faculties functioning propery and its being 
true): ‘Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F’s: 
feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body 
parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive… Truth, whatever that is, definitely 
takes the hindmost’ (Patricia Churchland, Journal of Philosophy 84, October 87, p. 548). It is true, 
Hume’s infant deity intended that the design plan of his creature’s cognitive system be aimed at truth 
(although he did not achieve his goal); by contrast, the evolutionary mechanism about which 
Churchland speaks, although has to do also with the cognitive faculties, is aimed at survival. However, 
Churchland quotation is still relevant for the distinction Plantinga wanted to make between reliability 
and proper function. 
   
 The Epistemology of Alvin Plantinga 131 
production of B) are functioning properly in a cognitive environment sufficiently 
similar to that for which S’s faculties are designed; and the modules of the design 
plan governing the production of B are (1) aimed at truth, and (2) such that there 
is a high objective probability that a belief formed in accordance with those 
modules (in that sort of cognitive environment) is true.’60 
 
3. Plantinga’s externalism 
 
3.1. The Gettier problems 
The philosopher Edmund Gettier published in 1963 a three-page paper61 
which, in Plantinga’s words, ‘has wrought havoc in contemporary epistemology’62. 
As its title said, the paper questioned the old view that knowledge is justified true 
belief. In Gettier’s opinion, belief, truth and justification are not sufficient for 
knowledge. One of his arguments in this regard (retold by Plantinga) was the 
following: ‘Smith comes into your office bragging about his new Ford, shows you 
the bill of sale and title, takes you for a ride in it, and in general supplies you with 
a great deal of evidence for the proposition that he owns a Ford. Naturally enough 
you believe the proposition Smith owns a Ford. Acting on the maxim that it never 
hurts to believe an extra truth or two, you infer from that proposition its 
disjunction with Brown is in Barcelona (Brown is an acquaintance of yours about 
whose whereabouts you have no information). As luck would have it, Smith is 
lying (he does not own a Ford) but Brown, by happy coincidence, is indeed in 
Barcelona. So your belief Smith owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is indeed 
both true and justified; but surely you can’t properly be said to know it.’63 
As one can easily observe, in this case it is inferred a justified true belief 
from a justified false belief (that Smith owns a Ford). Therefore, some of the early 
attempts at repairing the classical view on knowledge as justified belief was to 
stipulate that a belief constitute knowledge only if it is true and justified, and its 
justification is not obtained by inference from a false belief.  
But this is not the solution to Gettier problems. Some philosophers modified 
the aforementioned example so as to avoid the appeal to false premises when 
justifying the conclusion.64 There are also other Gettier examples which avoid this 
problem. For example, one of them, formulated by Bertrand Russell (and thus 
predating Gettier’s birth) sounds like this: A person happens to look at noon to a 
clock that stopped at midnight (previous night). His belief (that it is now 12.00) is 
true and in a sense justified, but clearly not knowledge.65 
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There have been many other attempts to provide a ‘fourth condition’66 
(beyond the three conditions that characterize the classical view of knowledge: 
truth, acceptance of it – belief, and justification of its acceptance), and many 
attempts to add an epicycle or two to circumvent Gettier. However, in Plantinga’s 
opinion, ‘in most cases the quick response has been another counterepicycle that 
circumvents the circumvention – which then calls for a counter-counterepicycle, 
and so on…’67 He thinks that the Gettier examples really show that the internalist 
accounts of warrant – the accounts which suggest that the knower can know that a 
certain belief has warrant (or justification) for her, and that she has epistemic 
access to whatever it is that makes for warrant – are fundamentally wanting. The 
common denominator of Gettier kinds of examples is – in Plantinga’s view – the 
fact that in each of these cases it is merely by accident that the justified true belief 
in question is true. It just happened that Brown is in Barcelona, or that the clock 
stopped at midnight and the viewer happened to look at it exactly at noon.  
In the above mentioned cases, although a true belief was formed and the 
faculties involved were functioning properly, there was still no warrant; the reason 
for this had to do with the local cognitive environment in which the beliefs in 
question were formed. This environment was in a way or other misleading; it 
deviated from the paradigm situations for which the faculty in question has been 
designed. Thus, the usually reliable Smith was lying (credulity is part of our 
design plan whereby for the most part we believe what our fellows will tell us, but 
this principle does not work well when our fellows lie); in a similar way the clock 
has unexpectedly stopped (the clock does not function in the paradigm situation 
for which it was designed to be used).68 
What is important in Gettier situations is that here the believer is justified in 
her beliefs, having done all that could be expected of her, and that the final lack of 
warrant ‘is in no way to be laid to her account’. Internalism in epistemology is a 
view about cognitive accessibility according to which what confers warrant to a 
belief ‘must be accessible, in some special way’, to us. In all Gettier cases the 
cognitive glitch – observes Plantinga  – ‘has to do with what is not accessible to 
the agent in this way.... What is essential to Gettier situations is the production of 
a true belief that has no warrant – despite conformity to the design plan in those 
aspects of the whole cognitive situation that are internal, in the appropriate sense, 
to the agent…There is conformity to the design plan on the part of the internal 
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aspects of the cognitive situation, but some feature of the cognitive situation 
external (in the internalist sense) to the agent forestalls warrant’.69  
In conclusion, Plantinga believes that the real significance of Gettier 
problems is that they show justification, conceived internalistically, to be 
insufficient for warrant; by contrast the externalist accounts of warrant will enjoy 
a certain immunity to these problems70. 
 
3.2. A critique of Plantinga’s solution to Gettier problems 
Some philosophers questioned the idea that Plantinga’s understanding of 
warrant is able to solve the Gettier problems.71 For example Peter Klein offered an 
example that suggests that a belief could meet Plantinga’s conditions of warrant 
and still be true by accident: ‘Jones believes that she owns a well-functioning 
Ford. She forms this belief in perfectly normal circumstances using her cognitive 
equipment that is functioning just perfectly. But as sometimes normally happens, 
unbeknownst to Jones, her Ford is hit and virtually demolished – let’s say while is 
parked outside her office. But also unbeknownst to Jones, she has just won a well-
functioning Ford in the Well-Functioning Ford Lottery that her company runs 
once a year’.72 
In the aforementioned example it is clear that, had Jones’ Ford not been hit and 
demolished, Plantinga’s conditions for warrant would have obtained and Jones would 
have known that she owned a Ford. But in the actual situation her belief is produced, 
according to Klein, by the very same processes functioning in the same way in the same 
cognitive environment. As result, either these both situations are ones in which Jones 
knows that she owns a Ford, or not. But clearly one is a case of knowledge, the other 
one not. Therefore Plantinga’s view on warrant is wrong. 
 
3.3. Plantinga’s answer to this critique 
In his ‘Respondeo’73 to Klein, Feldman and other critiques of his account of 
warrant (and in his essay ‘Warrant and accidentally true belief’74), Plantinga 
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answered to this challenge by developing a distinction between cognitive maxi-
environments and mini-environments.  A cognitive maxi-environment is to him 
more global and general than a cognitive mini-environment. Thus, the cognitive 
maxi-environment on our planet would include such (macroscopic) features as the 
presence of air and light with their properties, of some objects detectable by our 
cognitive systems, of other people, of the regularities of nature, etc. Our cognitive 
faculties are designed (by God, or by evolution or by both God and evolution) to 
function in this maxi-environment (or other environment similar to it). On the 
other side, a cognitive maxi-environment might contain many different cognitive 
mini-environments: for example, some in which Jones’ Ford is hit and destroyed 
by another vehicle, or one in which her Ford is not hit and destroyed. 
The important idea here is that some cognitive mini-environments are 
misleading (for example that in which Jone’s car is destroyed). In these cases 
(where the maxi-environments are right but the mini-environment are wrong) we 
have not warrant and knowledge. A belief could still be true - but only by accident 
– and therefore it could not qualify as knowledge. 
In Plantinga’s words, ‘S knows p, on a given occasion, only if S’s cognitive 
mini-environment, on that occasion, is not misleading – more exactly, not 
misleading with respect to the particular exercise of cognitive powers producing 
the belief that p. So the conditions of warrant need an addition: the maxi-
environment must indeed be favorable or appropriate, but so must also the 
cognitive mini-environment.’75 A mini-environment will be considered favorable 
for an exercise of our cognitive faculties when this exercise can be counted on to 
produce a true belief in that cognitive environment.76 
However, this account of warrant seems to Anhold Thorsten not very 
convincing. He raised the question: when do we really know that our mini-
environment is favorable for our faculties? Which are the criterions for 
‘favorableness’?77 
Plantinga’s answer: ‘when the exercise of our faculties can be counted on to 
produce true belief in the respective cognitive environment’ does not seem very 
satisfactory to him, probably because Thorsten would continue to ask: ‘but how 
could we know that the exercise of our faculties can be counted on to produce true 
beliefs?’. 
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In our opinion, Plantinga would answer to this critique to his model by 
pointing that – as in fact he did in a certain measure in his ‘Warrant and 
accidentally true belief’ – ‘our cognitive faculties are not maximally effective – 
not only that there is much we aren’t capable to know, but also in that we are 
sometimes prone to err, even when the maxi-environment is right and the relevant 
faculties are functioning properly’.78  
In other words, many times it is impossible for us to have access to whatever 
it makes for warrant. Due to Plantinga’s option for an externalist epistemology, he 
believes that we may sometimes think we know something when in fact we do 
not, and conversely, that we may sometimes know something without being able 
to offer (all) evidences for this knowledge (in other words, we might know 
something without knowing that we know it). An externalist, in opposition to the 
supporter of internalism, has a more robust sense of our human finitude, being 
adept of a more modest kind of epistemology. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We are able now to draw some conclusions and to offer a summary of what 
we presented in this essay.  
William Alston said – referring to the book Warrant and Proper Function – 
said that Plantinga’s account of warrant represents ‘a contribution of the first 
order of importance to epistemology’. We believe that this epistemology offers 
indeed an interesting view of knowledge, a view that is both plausible and 
convincing. Plantinga, of course, does not build this epistemology on void; on the 
contrary, he created it in a constant dialogue with other traditional and 
contemporary views on warrant. In many cases he agreed with certain parts of 
these accounts and incorporated them in his own model of warrant.  Thus, as we 
saw, he is a defender of a Reidian kind of foundationalism (our knowledge has 
foundations, but these foundations are fallible and include also the beliefs of 
common sense knowledge).  
He is also agreeing – in a certain measure – with evidentialism (our 
knowledge is based on evidences – seen in a broad sense – although these 
evidences are insufficient for a comprehensive model of warrant); but he also 
rejects the mainstream versions of evidentialism. Moreover, he agrees with 
reliabilism (our cognitive faculties need to be reliable; the probability of a belief 
produced by them being true should be high in order to have knowledge. But 
again, Plantinga sees this condition as only necessary, not also sufficient for his 
account for warrant). 
 And, as we saw at the end of our essay, he is an externalist (for him a 
knower need not have epistemic access to whatever it is that makes for warrant: 
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she may sometimes think she knows something when in fact she does not, and 
conversely, she may sometimes know something without knowing that she knows 
it or how she knows it). 
His position in relation to such debates as modernism versus postmodernism 
is also original: he disagrees in a certain measure with both philosophical 
perspectives, although in part agrees with some of their insights too. Thus, against 
modernism (especially classical foundationalism), he agrees that we no more 
could claim for truth the Cartesian kind of certainty suggested by modernists. But 
against postmodernism, he does not see in this partial relativisation of truth the 
disappearing of the very concept of truth and the ‘death’ of epistemology (which 
are proclaimed by some postmodernists).79 
In the end Plantinga combines all these classical and contemporary insights 
in a unique and original synthesis.  
His account on warrant is also essential for his religious epistemology (and 
his philosophy of religion in general) – but the religious implications of his 
epistemology are complex, and do not constitute the object of this essay.  
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